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I.  Introduction 
Recently  there  have  been  a  surge  of  studies  that  have  explored  the  relationship  among 
endowments, institutions  and  the  provision  of  public  goods  (see,  for  instance,  Acemoglu  et  al., 
2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). These works have focused on the enforcement of property 
rights and, by their very nature tend to slight within-country differences. In this work, I focus on 
another institution -- fiscal federalism, or rules that allocate fiscal decision-making power between 
a  central  authority  and  smaller  geographic  sub-areas  (for  example,  states).2  Federalism  has 
implications for the efficient allocation of resources – for example, between the public and private 
sectors or the development of national markets; and, as argued here, in variations in economic 
development within countries.  
  I study the evolution of fiscal federalism in two Latin American countries: Brazil and Mexico. 
Particularly,  I  study  why  both  countries  developed  different  federalist  institutions,  given  their 
similarities in socioeconomic and institutional variables. Brazil has been more decentralized than 
Mexico  throughout  the  twentieth  Century  and  it  has  also  collected  consistently  more  public 
revenue. These differences in tax decentralization cannot be explained by standard cross-country 
determinants  since  there  is  no enough  variance in  the  relevant  variables (Treisman,  2006  and 
Panizza,  1999).  This  paper  proposes  an  alternative  historical  explanation  to  account  for  these 
differences. As a large literature has pointed out recently (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 1997; Sokoloff and Zolt, 2006), economic institutions (such as fiscal ones) are product of 
long term historical, political and economic processes and, even more important, are very relevant 
to achieve high levels of development. The understanding of the origins of fiscal and federalist 
institutions in both countries is key to analyze the current problems of these institutions, as well as 
their  consequences  on  welfare,  growth  and  inequality.  Moreover,  this  analysis  may  provide 
important insights about the historical constraints that countries have faced in the past and it is 
facing in the present to launch fiscal reforms that reallocate tax power between the Federation and 
Subnational governments. This is particular relevant for countries like Brazil and Mexico that have 
tried to change their tax systems, at least since the last two decades.   
                                                 
2 Other concepts used through this work very related to federalism are: decentralization, which “is viewed as 
a shift of authority towards local governments and away from central government” (Rodden, 2004, p. 482) 
and  federal  bargain  refers  about  the  rules  and  powers  that  define  the  interaction  between  the  central 
government and the subunits.  2 
 
   As a framework to rationalize the tax federalist trends in both countries, I develop a game-
theoretic model of fiscal federalism in which the players  – a local and a federal government  – 
bargain over tax and revenue sharing rules. How much bargaining power the local government has 
depends on a variety of factors, including the value of its factor endowments. If those endowments 
increase (exogenously) in value relative to those controlled by the federal government, the local 
government is able to extract concessions from the center – in the context of the model, the ability 
to “control” its own fiscal destiny.  
Unlike Sokoloff and Zolt (2006), who argued that current Latin American tax institutions 
are product of the path dependence of colonial institutions, I argue that the making of federalist 
institutions was the result of important changes in the distribution of bargaining power between 
the  “core”  (the  federal  government)  and  the  “periphery”  (states)  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
Century. The regional balance of power in Brazil and Mexico was modified by the high rates of 
economic growth enjoyed in the region. The economic expansion of both countries was based on 
the production of commodities for international consumption. The export growth was possible due 
to  the  industrialization  and  the  developed  countries´  income  growth  that  pushed  up  the 
international demand for raw materials and commodities. In addition, technological innovations 
allowed the economic integration of the world as it reduced the transport costs between and within 
countries (see Cárdenas, et al., 2003).  
The main argument of the paper is that differences in the type of endowments determined 
the  commodities  in  which  each  country  developed  their  competitive  advantage  in  the  global 
economy. I argue that the characteristics of the commodities, along with their regional distribution 
and the regional autonomy to trade them, are keys to understand the local elites bargaining power 
that was the engine of the changes in the division of fiscal responsibilities in both nations. The 
absence  of  a significant shock  that  would have  altered  the  relative  power  between  center and 
periphery provoke that federalist fiscal institutions persisted until nowadays.  
For the Brazilian case, the model shows how the relative economic power between states 
and federal governments determined the division of fiscal responsibilities in the 1891 Constitution. 
A number of factors – some systematic, others serendipitous – led Brazil to draft a “decentralized” 
Constitution in 1891. First, there were (and are) significant differences in soil types and weather 
conditions across Brazil, creating region-based comparative advantages in certain crops. Second, in 
some of these crops, the most important of which was coffee, Brazil had effective international 
monopolies at the time. Third, the Brazilian state that traditionally had supplied much of the world 3 
 
coffee demand happened to be the capital region – Rio de Janeiro – but Rio’s endowments could not 
keep pace with demand growth over time, and coffee production shifted away from the center to 
the “periphery” – São Paulo. Fourth, certain unforeseen political events – specifically, the sickness, 
overthrow and eventual death of the Emperor – created a unique opportunity to rewrite the “rules 
of the game,” that is, the Constitution. Newly enriched by the growth in the world coffee market, São 
Paulo’s  elites  took  advantage  of  the  situation  to  rewrite  the  federalist  rules  to  the  economic 
advantage of their region. The empirical contributions in this paper are based on newly collected 
archival  data.  Using  state-level  panel  data  I  demonstrate  that  state  public  revenues  per  capita 
became closely aligned with exports per capita, but only  after the 1891 Constitution had been 
enacted. This shows that the increasing of local bargaining power change the rules of the game and 
in the actual capacity of states to collect tax revenues.  
On  the other  hand,  Mexico  was centralizing  the collection  of  public  revenue  during  the 
tenure of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1880 and 1894-1910). I argue that the centralization is explained by 
the lack of capacity of the states to exploit and trade their own economic resources by themselves. 
The scarcity of domestic capital to invest in mining (such as silver, zinc, gold) and railroads made 
local  elites  depend  heavily  on  the  decisions  taken  on  the  center  of  the  country.  The  federal 
government was in charge of the decisions on the allocation of foreign investors on minerals and 
railroads,  connecting  production  centers  to  ports  and  US  border.  These  constraints made  local 
elites very weak as their secession threat was not credible because their outside option was very 
low. The result was that Díaz could centralize not only the economy policy decisions but it also 
increased the control over the territory and fiscal resources. Unfortunately, data limitation at state 
level for Mexico unable me to perform an empirical strategy similar to the one presented for Brazil.  
To the best of my knowledge, the only attempt to rationalize the federalist path of both 
countries is Díaz Cayeros (2006). My contribution is that I explore the sources of bargaining power 
that states  elites in  Brazil  and  Mexico  had  to  negotiate for  fiscal  authority.  In  contrast  to  Díaz 
Cayeros, which analyze the federalist equilibriums along the twentieth Century, I argue that the 
main changes in these institutions happened in the end of the nineteenth Century as a product of 
trade shocks that changed the regional balance of power. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to examine whether 
the difference in federalist institutions between both countries could be explained by standard 
theories.  Third  section  describes  the  analytical  framework.  Next  two  sections  discuss  the 4 
 
experiences of Brazil and Mexico of fiscal federalism in the turn of the twentieth Century. Last part 
of the paper concludes and discusses possible further work in the topic.  
 
II.  Fiscal Decentralization in Brazil and Mexico 
Literature on Fiscal Decentralization  
An  important  branch  of  the  literature  on  fiscal  federalism  holds  that  efficiency  criteria  should 
determine  the  allocation  of  fiscal  and  expenditure  responsibilities  among  tiers  of  governments 
(Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). In this tradition, the federal government is more efficient collecting 
taxes from mobile bases as it prevents multiple state tax rates; which makes difficult the integration 
of  national  markets  for  goods  and  inputs,  it  minimizes  deadweight  losses  and  increase  public 
revenue. However, the cost of excessive centralization is the mismatch between public policies and 
people’s preferences as local governments arguably have a better sense of the needs and likes of 
their  own  constituencies.  However,  there  are  not  many  scholars  who  still  think  that  efficiency 
criteria are enough to explain the distribution of fiscal resources among the levels of government 
(Treisman, 2006). Derived from the belief that fiscal decisions are not taken based only upon the 
maximization of the social welfare, another school of thought has surged recently. They argue that 
public officers do not always make decisions thinking in the common good but considering their 
own  political  and  personal  objectives.  They  respond  to  incentives  provided  by  the  political 
institutions and the results of those interactions may create outcomes far apart from the optimal 
social solution.3  
In a positive tradition , authors like Panizza (1999), Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) and 
Treisman (2006) explore empirically the determinants of decentralization. In sum, they find that 
countries that are ethnically more heterogeneous tend to have more decentralizing tax systems as 
they have different preferences about the amount and type of public goods they demand.  The 
national government is less able to identify the localized demand for public goods and, furthermore, 
they cannot provide efficiently different levels of public goods across regions. A second factor is 
country size. Large and more populous countries are more decentralized because it is more 
expensive to satisfy local demands in areas far from the Center. Democracy is a third determi nant 
as the design of public policies in democracies is closely link to the preferences of citizens who have 
more influence in the local sphere. There has   also  been found that economic development is 
correlated with levels of decentralization. As people be come richer they participate more in local 
                                                 
3 For a discussion about the two views, see Weingast (2006). 5 
 
public  policy  to  improve  the  provision  of  public  goods.  Another  variable  which  could  be  of 
importance to explain the degree of decentralization is the size of the government as percentage of 
GDP4. However, the relationship between public revenue and decentralization  has not been well 
defined in the literature. On one hand, it is argued that more decentralized fiscal responsibilities 
(Bird, et al., 2004) are more efficient because the public goods provided by the go vernments are 
closer to the preferences of the citizens. This would boost the total tax collection because there 
would be more willingness to pay taxes and higher demand for public goods and services. However, 
great fiscal autonomy may lead to a competence among local governments, decreasing tax rates, tax 
income, and expenditures in order to attract investment and consumption. This mechanism is 
known as “Leviathan” (see Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The analytical framework presented in 
the  next  section  supports  the  idea  that  both  variables  are  positively  correlated  because  local 
governments  have  more  incentives  to  collect  public  revenue  if  they  have  a  high  control  on 
expenditure.   
Decentralization differences in Brazil and Mexico 
Brazil  and  Mexico  has  important  differences  in  their  tax  structure.  The  public  sector  in  Brazil 
collected around 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2004, while Mexico just collected 
around  25  percent  (Table  2  in  Appendix  B).5  Moreover,  Brazil is far more decentralized th an 
Mexico:  while  Brazil’s  Federation  collects  around  two  thirds  of  the  total  public  revenue,  the 
Mexican  central  government  collects  more  than  90  percent  of  the  total  public  revenue.  Once 
intergovernmental transfers are made, local governments have access to 40 percent of the total 
revenue in Brazil Mexico, compare to 20 percent in Mexico. The dependence of local governments 
to the federal transfers is by far lower in Brazil than in Mexico: while in Brazil 20 percent of the 
local governments’ budget is financed through intergovernmental transfers, this percentage is 80 
percent in Mexico. Finally, the direct Brazilian taxes accounted for about two thirds of the tax 
revenue in 2004 (the other third is indirect taxes); in Mexico the distribution between both kinds of 
taxes is half and half.  
Looking at the variables that explain fiscal decentralization in the literature, we find that 
there  is  no  significant  differences  between  these  two  countries  that  help  us  to  understand  to 
understand  their  fiscal  asymmetries.  For  instance,  Brazil  and  Mexico  have  similarities  in 
                                                 
4 For a review about the determinants on fiscal performance, see Bird, et al. (2004). 
5 See IBGE (2001), Estatísticas do Século XX, www.ibge.gov.br and Sexto Informe de Gobierno, (Mexico 2006). 6 
 
urbanization rates, trade openness6 and population density7; as well as in other socioe conomic 
indicators (see Table  1  in Appendix B), all factors associated   in the literature  to  explain  fiscal 
variables. Particularly, development and democracy are very similar in Mexico and Brazil, so they 
cannot explain the heterogeneity in fiscal decentralization. The main differences between both 
countries are the extension of the territory and perhaps the language f ractionalization index 
(population’s heterogeneity). Although Brazil’s area is four times Mexico’s, more than 75 percent 
(North and Center-West regions) of Brazil’s territory is scarcely populated (around 13 percent of 
the Brazilian population with a 10 percent share of the GDP). Historically, most of the economic 
activities have been developed in the 30 percent remaining territory. If this would be our target 
territory, Brazil would be only 25 percent bigger than Mexico. Moreover, as it will be developed 
later, Brazil had periods of centralization (and Mexico of decentralization) in the nineteen Century 
contradicting the large country explanation, as this is a constant variable for both countries in the 
studied period.8 The language fractionalization can neither explain differences in decentralization, 
because it is more fractionalized in Mexico  (and equal in the ethnic fractionalization index)  and 
according to theory this would make it a more decentralizing country, but, again, it is not the case. 
Given that we are unable to explain tax differences with current determinants, we would like to see 
whether these asymmetries have an historical explanation.  
Those key differences in their fiscal systems have persisted historically, at least, during all 
the twentieth Century. Consistently, Brazil has been more decentralized than Mexico (see figure 1 
in Appendix B ). The same graph shows that the respective trends began by the end of the 
nineteenth  Century.  Before  that,  both  countries  came  from  opposite  positions:  Br azil  was  a 
centralized Empire and Mexico was more decentralized. Restrictions in historical data prevent us of 
doing a comprehensive analysis of whether  the explanatory variables identified in the standard 
literature that had changes in both countries could explain the differences in federalist structures. 
However, some estimation has been made for GDP per capita. This is a relevant variable because it 
                                                 
6 The degree of openness is usually measured as international trade as percentage of GDP. According to this 
ratio, Mexico trade twice as Brazil does, but Mexico’s maquila concentrates around 35 percent of Mexican 
international trade due to his close location to the US market and low labor costs (Mexico, 2005). Anyway, tax 
determinants literature says that more openness should impact positively into the tax collection. In that case, 
Mexico is supposed to have a big state. 
7 Mexican population is thrice as concentrated as Brazil. However, the latter’s territory is composed mostly by 
the  Amazon forest;  density  in  this  area  is  only  around  5  habitants  per  square  kilometer.  The  other  165 
millions  of  Brazilians  live  in  the  other  regions,  making  the  density  being  much  similar  to  Mexico’s:  73 
habitants per square kilometer. 
8 In addition, the main Brazil’s decentralization movements were located in states neighbors to the capital, 
disregarding the hypothesis that far from the Center provinces could push for more autonomy.  7 
 
is correlated with most of the other indicators. What we can see is that the GDP per capita gap 
between Brazil and Mexico has consistently favored slightly the latter one (see figure 2 in Appendix 
B),  contradicting  the  literature,  which  affirms  that  more  developed  countries  have  larger 
governments with higher participation of local and state governments. Territory extension does not 
seem to have played an important role, since they have not suffered relevant modifications in the 
last 150 years in both countries. Extensive democratization in both countries took place until the 
last  decades  of  the  last  Century.  Regarding  the  population  heterogeneity,  Mexico’s  racial 
composition has not had important changes during the last two Centuries. On the other hand, Brazil 
received migration waves from Europe during the last decades of the nineteenth Century and first 
of the last one, modifying the population characteristics. However, international migration was a 
consequence  of  migration  policies  instrumented  by  federal  and  state  governments  in  order  to 
assure labor supply for coffee plantations (Viotti da Costa, 1989; Holloway, 1980). Those are the 
same  circumstances  which,  as  it  is  argued  here,  led  to  decentralization  in  Brazil  in  1891. 
Furthermore, the ones who promoted migrants were the planters, a key player in the policy making 
of the epoch, including the decisions over fiscal issues.  
The historical approach to this puzzle has been little explored in the literature. Díaz Cayeros 
(2006) is one of the exceptions. He explores why four Latin American countries (including Brazil 
and Mexico) have had different federalism paths during the twentieth Century. His main concern 
though  is  how  those  countries  were  able  to  construct  a  credible  transfer  system  between  the 
Federation and States. According to Díaz Cayeros, Mexico has a national oriented local politician 
with high centralized revenue, while Brazil is the opposite in both dimensions.  
I explore the hypothesis that regional distribution and control over the economic resources 
explains the bargaining power of local elites when negotiating by fiscal resources. This provides an 
alternative  explanation  about  the  contrasting  patterns  in  both  countries,  and  for  which  the 
standard literature is unable to offer an explanation, as well as the sources of local bargaining 
power. Finally, I also argue that federalist arrangements have their roots in the last half of the 
nineteenth Century.   
III.  A Game of Bargaining for Tax Revenue in a Federation 
The model focuses on the role of the economic incentives and conflict threat in fiscal federalist 
agreements. I argue that fiscal agreements contained strategic decisions aiming to the pursuit of 
economic  benefits  for  the  actors  –  Federation  and  States.  Their  strategies  and  outcomes  were 
constrained by their economic power. The analytical framework borrows some features from the 8 
 
literature  on  the  role  and  credibility  of  secession  threats  (see  Arzaghi  and  Henderson,  2005, 
Panizza, 1999, and Bolton and Roland, 1997). However, in this literature, the role of the states is 
residual,  because  tax  share  is  a  Federal  Government´s  choice  and  local  governments´  strategic 
actions are missing in those works. In a framework where states bargain directly with the federal 
government,  Díaz  Cayeros  (2006)  focuses  on  the  sustainability  of  the  fiscal  pact,  presenting  a 
principal-agent  model  where  the  equilibrium  depends,  similar  to  my  work,  on  the  economic 
capacity of the states. Yet my model highlights the sources of bargaining power of the players and 
the incentives of both levels of government to exert effort in order to realize production and tax 
revenue.  
 
Setup of the game  
The model has two players: Federal Government (FG) and Local Government (LG). The country is 
divided in two regions: center and periphery. FG governs over both regions and LG only over the 
latter one. For the sake of simplicity, the model uses only one negotiating LG. Both governments 
have  to  decide  whether  to  stay  unified  or  to  constitute  separate  countries.  Both  levels  of 
government want to maximize their utility, which is a function of the tax revenue they collect. Tax 
revenue is determined by the tax base or the income of the country (ty), where t is the tax rate9 and 
y  is  the  country’s  income.  Potential  production  in  both  regions  (K=kF+kL)  requires  that  both 
governments exert maximum effort. Thus, differences between actual and potential production is 
attributable to lower than maximum effort exerted by both governments. There are two forces that 
make effort to be different from the potential production one: it is costly to be exerted by both 
governments and the incentives that governments had given the tax share rule. This setup implies 
that a fundamental input for production to be realized depends on governments´ performance. For 
instance, effort can be thought as provision of public goods such as infrastructure (roads, railroads, 
ports, etc.), negotiation for preferential tariffs in foreign markets, enforcement of property rights, 
protection against external threats and internal instability, enforcement of tax laws, among others. 
The better the governments performs, the better the markets function, the closer a country reaches 
                                                 
9 This model does not analyze the welfare of citizens as the tax rate is exogenous. A potential extension of the 
analytical framework may include a payoff function of the relevant citizens of the two regions depending on 
public and private goods in order to calculate the optimal tax rate. This obviously would be another dimension 
that players would bargain for. As the scope of the paper is  the explanation of bargaining power from the 
economic dependence and relative strengthen between Federation and states, I leave out efficiency issues.  9 
 
its economic potential and the more the government collects tax revenue. However, the fulfillment 
of these public responsibilities has a cost for governments.  
Total tax revenue collection in the country is defined by:  
(1)    (       )         (       )       (     )    
Both    and      [0,1]. θ is the FG’s marginal productivity and 1-θ is the LG one10. The relative 
marginal productivities also refer to the degree of “relative” autonomy of the players to produce on 
its territory. Suppose that a province that it is very well endowed in commodities but that it does 
not  have  the  means  to  exploit  them,  since  it  does  not  have  investment  resources  or  adequate 
infrastructure to transport the goods as well as permission from other provinces (or FG) to trade 
them. In this case, the province would probably require help from the federal government to know 
how to produce and trade its resources. In this hypothetical example, θ would be very high and 
local government production would depend highly from the Center. In addition, note that when 
both governments exert maximum effort (equal to 1) the actual production level will be equal to the 
potential production K= 11. 
Before  collecting  tax  revenues,  parties  have  to  decide  whether  they  write  a  joint 
Constitution to define how the revenue will be distributed. The negotiating variable is the share of 
the collected revenue which will retain LG (0≤α≤1). The payoffs of the players are: 
(2)        (     )    (       )  
  
 
      and   




for FG and LG respectively. Each government has a stock of effort normalized to 1. 
  Tax share variable is defined in the contract, while    and    are non-contractible and non-
transferable. Each party tries to maximize its own utility. Effort is costly reflecting administrative 
costs of the government work, and generates disutility. Thus, tax share and governments´ efforts 
are the variables to solve in the model, which should be in function of the exogenous variables: tax 
rate, potential product, and marginal productivity of public effort.  
                                                 
10 No intrinsic productivity of collecting revenue is modeled as the study cases collected most of their revenues 
in  customs  offices  (imports  and  export  taxes)  where  tax  collection  is  easier  to perform  and  contraband  is 
harder. 
11 As the federal government has a strategic advantage over local governments by historical and military 
reasons, the negotiation can be taken only over yL. Thus, the federal government does not negotiate over 
their tax base and all negotiation may be focused on local government tax base. This assumption, however, 
does not change the main messages of the analytical framework.  
F L k k 10 
 
  The timing of the game consists of three stages: 1) FG offers a tax share contract    to LG12. 
2) LG decides whether to accept or re ject  the  offer.  If  LG  accepts  α,  it  will  be  defined  in  the 
Constitution. If LG rejects the offer, each party collects separately in their own territory. 3) After LG 
takes a decision, FG and LG exert effort, outputs are realized and payoffs are received. So, the profile 
strategies for the FG is <  > and for the LG the strategy set is to accept if    (  )     
  and to reject 
if   (  )     
  >. Then, we have two potential outcomes: a single country where the tax division is 
given by the FG offer; or two separate countries in which each government collects their own 
revenue.   
  refers to the utility obtained by the LG if it becomes independent from the FG. So we 
require, in order to LG to accept the FG offer, that LG had at least the same welfare as it would be 
independent. If this does not happen it is optimal for LG to separate. Implicitly, the FG also decides 
whether to work in conjunction with LG or not. If there is no tax share that makes him better than 
being independent, FG would offer a tax share that it knows will be rejected. The utility equations 
for independent LG and FG are respectively: 
(4)   




(5)   




The payoffs of the players are defined according to the outcome and are defined by equations (2) to 
(5).  
 
Solving the game 
The equilibrium concept for this game is a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, I solve 
through backward induction. The first step is to maximize the governments’ utilities (Equations 2 
and 3), given the terms of the contract, to find the optimal effort levels:    
(6)             (     )    
(7)          (     )       
Effort  is  positively  correlated  to  tax  revenue  share.  The  interior  solution  is  guaranteed  when
. With K too big, the marginal profit of more effort is very high and it is 
optimal to exert the maximum effort. The proof involves finding under which conditions the players 
will not exert effort equal to one, under maximum incentives (tax share equal to one) on the other 
                                                 
12 The fact that FG moves first is crucial for the dynamics of the game because it is also a source of bargaining 
power  between  players.  This  fact  is  based  on  that  federalist  rules  are  usually  agreed  at  Federal  Congress. 
Moreover, the tax contributions from the regions are usually not voluntary. FG has control over the army (see 
Treisman, 2000). 
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party, given that the other party also exerts effort equal to one. With the knowledge of the optimal 
effort, FG maximizes its utility respect to the bargained variable (replacing the optimal values of 
efforts in equations (6) and (7) into the FG utility function stated in equation (2)):  
(8)          
(   )(  )   
    (     ) (  ) (     )  
Optimizing the above expression (the unrestricted utility of the FG) with respect to , we know that 
FG offers LG: 
(9)     
   (   ) 
    (   )   
Replacing (9)  in (6) and (7), we obtain the optimal efforts: 
(10)    
   
  (   )(    )
    (   )   
(11)    
   
(   ) ( )  
 (   )     
With (10) and (11) we get the total tax revenue of the government replacing these terms into 
equation (1): 
(12)       (  )  [
   (   )  (   ) (    )   
 (   )     ]=(  ) [
 (   )    
 (   )    ] 
Using (9) and (12), we know the share of tax revenue retained by the LG: 
(13)         (  )  [
 (   )  (    ) 
( (   )    ) ] 
Then we can calculate the utility obtained by the LG if accepts the FG offer: 
(14)       [
 (  ) (   ) (    )   
( (   )    )  ] 
The agreement requires that both parties get a higher payoff than the one obtained if they had 
decided  to  keep  separated  and  collect  the  taxes  only  on  its  own  territory.  LG  payoff  ( )  is 
equation (4). The optimal effort in this case is   
     (     )   with an indirect utility function equal 
to  
(15)    
   
( (   )  ) 
   .  
In this case, tax share is suppressed since the state rules itself and no negotiation takes place. 
Analogously,   
     ( )    and   
   
( ( )  ) 
  . 
Finally, LG will accept FG offer when expression (14) is greater than (15) and this will happen 
when: 
(16) 
 (    )  






  The most important implication of the model is that a high FG’s efficiency (high ) implies a 
lower bargaining power of LG to opt out as its production depends much on FG. In other words, if 
LG would decide to become an independent country would be unable to produce as much as it 
would produce with FG help. So, in cases where the province is potentially rich and autonomous, FG 
would have to offer better terms to LG in order to keep the country united.13 Moreover, the richer 
the province is (high  kL), the higher its outside option and its bargaining power will be to get a 
better deal from the Center.  
In summary, we have two equilibriums: when condition (16) is met, LG accepts FG offer 
(  ), both regions conform a single country, exert optimal efforts (10) and (11), and LG gets (14) as 
its payoff. If the proportion of local potential production is high enough to avoid an agreement 
between LG and FG, in equilibrium LG rejects    and 2 countries are formed with   
  and   
  as 
optimal efforts and   
  and   
  as payoffs.  
Applying the results for Brazil and Mexico, we can say that both countries had provinces 
that were very rich (high kL) in proportion of the national country production but not as high to 
prevent the center and the periphery from making an agreement on staying united. However, the 
tax share was higher in Brazil than in Mexico. The difference was due to the value of  , as in Mexico 
was very high because local elites and government had no autonomy to exploit the endowments. 
Rich mining endowments required capital that was very scarce locally. Even in the case that local 
elites were autonomous to exploit mining sources, they have not easy access to markets or exports 
points (ports or border). So, they depended heavily on FG provision of capital and infrastructure, 
decreasing its bargaining power. On the other, hand agricultural activities in Brazil were performed 
independently by local landlords and, moreover, most of the states had access to sea, which allow 
them to trade without central authorization. So, in Brazil   was low, which allows LG to get a high 
share of tax revenue.  
IV.  Understanding Fiscal Federalism in Brazil in the Nineteenth Century 
How does the analytical framework fit with historical events in Brazil? After independence (in 
1824) Brazil had a constitutional monarchy, in which the federal government collected and kept 
most  of  the  tax  revenue.  In  1889,  a  relatively  peaceful  republican  revolution  overthrew  the 
monarch and called a constitutional assembly. The 1891 Constitution altered the federalist pact in a 
                                                 
13 In the current setting, I assume that the separation process is peaceful but we can consider costs incurred 
in a conflict, which might hinder the payoffs of secession, or the state could even been surrendered by the FG 
army and lose any capacity of negotiation within the Federation. 
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significant way and gave states ample powers to collect taxes. As I will explain below, the model in 
the previous section explains the fiscal contract both, before and after 1891. 
First, let me explain why there was a change in regime in 1889. After the relatively peaceful 
reigns of emperors Pedro I and Pedro II, in November of 1889 a republican movement deposed the 
monarchy. The proximate determinants of this shift in regime type are not difficult to identify 
(Viotti da Costa, 1989; Fausto, 1999). In 1887, Pedro II became extremely ill (evidently, diabetes 
and neurological complications) which obligated him to severely diminish his governing. Before 
traveling to Europe for medical treatment, he left the county in charge of his daughter, Princess 
Isabel.  Isabel  was  married  to  Count  d’Eu,  a  Frenchman  who  generated  animosity  among  the 
Brazilian elite, thereby diminishing the prospect of a “Third Reign” after the inevitable death of the 
Emperor. The second reason was the abolition of slavery in 1888, over the objections of slave 
owners who had been among the monarchy’s most ardent supporters. Next, the army had become 
dissatisfied with its political status under the monarchy and its share of the public budget, and its 
loyalties were up for grabs. Last, and most important for this paper, there was the emergence of a 
powerful “republican-federalist” movement among the owners of coffee plantations in São Paulo, an 
elite that furnished “a stable social footing for the republic that neither the army nor inhabitants of 
the city of Rio could provide on their own” (Fausto, 1999 p. 141). 
  The nineteenth Century Brazilian economy was agriculture-based and export-oriented. The 
ratio of exports to GDP fluctuated between 20 and 33 percent between 1861 and 1913, and the 
annual growth rate of exports averaged 3.7 percent (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Summerhill, 2001). 
Brazil’s exports were concentrated in a small number of commodities, the most important of which 
by far were coffee and natural rubber. Of the two, coffee was quantitatively more important, its 
export share ranging from 40 to as much as 70 percent of total exports over the period 1831 to 
1940. Rubber’s share of exports peaked at about 30 percent around the turn of the Century but 
eventually declined as a result of intense competition from Asian sources after 1910. During the 
colonial era, sugar had also been an important export but its share declined substantially over the 
course of the nineteenth Century.    
Brazil’s coffee plantations were so productive that by the middle of nineteenth Century the 
country accounted for more than half of the international coffee market. Brazil capitalized on its 
inherent comparative advantage in coffee production as demand for the beverage grew rapidly in 
the United States and Western Europe in the nineteenth Century (Martins and Johnston, 1992).  14 
 
  The push for a new bargaining equilibrium among states and the federal government was 
the consequence of the growing power of the São Paulo coffee elites. During most of the nineteenth 
Century coffee production was concentrated in the Paraiba Valley (an area between the states of 
Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo). Almost all exports were shipped from the port of Rio 
de Janeiro. The centrality of Rio in the nation’s burgeoning coffee economy provided stability to the 
regime  of  Pedro  II  (Murilo,  1993;  Love,  1993).  However,  the  privileged  position  of  the  capital 
province did not last for long; by the 1870’s and 1880’s coffee production was moving away from 
Rio and strongly toward its neighbor state, São Paulo (see Table 3 and Figure 3 in Appendix B).  
The expansion of production in São Paulo was in response to persistent growth in world 
demand,  as  reflected  in  relatively  high  prices  (Clarence  Smith  and  Topik,  2003).  São  Paulo’s 
comparative advantage in coffee production was manifold – virgin land, better soil, topography, and  
weather (Cano, 1977; Schulz, 1996).14 The demise of slavery hastened Rio’s relative decline as a 
coffee producer, as slavery was concentrated in the capital region.15 By contrast, planters in the new 
region relied heavily on European immigrants. São Paulo went so far as to petition Princess Isabel 
to admit foreigners from non-Catholic countries, a petition that she denied, furthering the conflict 
between the Crown and São Paulo’s coffee elites. Coffee’s profitability in São Paulo was also boosted 
by  the  region’s  extensive  rail  network  and  the  rapid  adoption  of  new  growing  techniques  and 
associated capital (Cano, 1977).  
 
The Equilibrium before 1889: The Federal Government Takes All 
In the equilibrium before 1889, the Imperial (federal) government collected somewhat more than 
eighty percent of the national public revenue because local governments (and local elites) had low 
bargaining power (low kL).  
  Over two-thirds of public revenue during the Empire derived from import tariffs and export 
taxes. The conventional wisdom is that trade taxes were used because of lower collection costs and 
because landlords were opposed to property taxes. The Constitution of 1824, established that the 
central  government  was  responsible  for  collecting  trade  taxes,  while  provinces  were  explicitly 
forbidden from collecting import duties or from levying taxes on inter-provincial trade. Although 
                                                 
14 There is a 40 year cycle to coffee production, at which point the tress and soil become unproductive. In 1882, 
more than 60 percent of the coffee trees in Paraiba Valley region were older than 40 years of age. See Cano 
(1977). 
15 The abolition was a smooth process which started at 1851, when the importation of slaves was forbidden by 
the British; and continued in 1872, with the “Law of the Free Womb;” and in 1885 with the liberation of slaves 
of more than 65 years. In 1885, banks stopped using slaves as guarantees for loans.   15 
 
provinces were constitutionally forbidden to collect import taxes and inter-provincial taxes there 
were no explicit rules against levying export taxes, and some apparently did.16  
  Regionally, around half of the federal public revenue was collected in the capital, which was 
responsible for more than two thirds of the expenditure (see Table  3 in Appendix B). This figure 
may  be  biased  because  some  of  the  public  expenditure  in  “national”  public  goods  should  be 
attributed  to  Rio  de  Janeiro.  However,  if  we  consider  just  the  expenditure  of  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture and Public Works (responsible for internal improvements such as railroads, ports, and 
so forth; see Villela, 2007) about 66 percent of its budget was spent in the capital area in 1888, and 
only 3 percent in São Paulo.17 Even allowing for Rio’s share of exports or population, the fiscal 
system appears to have been very “centralized”.18    
 
The New Equilibrium: Fiscal Federalism after 1891 
As the model would predict, elites in states that were becoming export powerhouses by the end of 
the nineteenth Century bargained to keep more tax revenues and used the threat of secession to 
push  for  a  new  federalist  arrangement.  In  fact,  the  limited  legal  capacity  that  provincial 
governments had to collect public revenue and the Imperial government’s apparent unwillingness 
to redistribute fiscal resources were the causes of permanent conflicts. For instance, according to 
Love  (1980  pp.103-104)  São  Paulo’s  elite  complained  that  “revenues  in  1870’s  were  totally 
inadequate  to  meet  the  provincial  government’s  responsibilities  for  road  construction  and 
maintenance, public health and education.” Moreover, “[t]he Republicans of São Paulo called for a 
distribution of revenues that would allow the province to meet the requirements of the expanding 
export  economy,  and  for  political  autonomy  to  maximize  São  Paulo’s  economic  potential”. 
Furthermore,  their  discontent  is  reflected  by  the  fact  that  “[s]ome  Paulista  Republicans  even 
threatened to set a separatist course for the province if a Federation was not achieved” (emphasis 
added), They also felt underrepresented in the Congress, as only seven percent of the deputies and 
                                                 
16 Even the explicit constitutional provisions were sometimes violated; for example, in northeast provinces the 
import taxes represented between 20 percent and 33 percent of the provincial revenue, with tax rates of 30 
percent in Pernambuco for inter-provincial imports. See Mello (1984).  
17 This is consistent with the work of Villela (2007), who shows that the Imperial government had a deficit with 
the North and a surplus with the South.  
18 Exports for Rio de Janeiro are overestimated as this does not include goo ds from Minas Gerais that were 
shipped  from  the  capital.  Adjusting  for  this  makes  the  centralization  of  fiscal  expenditure  even  more 
pronounced. 16 
 
3 out of 69 senators were from São Paulo.19 Fiscal discontent was not confined to São Paulo; similar 
complaints were voiced in Para, Rio Grando do Sul, and Pernambuco (Mello, 1984; Viotti da Costa, 
1989).  
  After the revolution of 1889, the Republican government called a constitutional assembly 
and wrote the first draft of the new constitution. This draft was sent to the Assembly where it faced 
two critical votes. First, it was voted on by the “Commission of the 21,” where each state had one 
representative; and second, the initiative was presented for discussions and vote by the plenary 
(Costa, 1998).  
  One of the most important issues debated was the division of fiscal control between the 
central government and states. The Federal Government initially proposed that export taxes would 
be collected by the states but that the taxes would be abolished in 1898. This proposal was rejected 
as a non-starter by the Commission of the 21. Other proposals that were rejected included special 
import taxes on foreign goods consumed within states, and a clause that reserved for the states all 
powers  not  explicitly  attributed  to  the  federal  government.20  Both proposals were rejected by 
narrow margins in the assembly (123 to 98 and 123 to 103 respectively). Finally, the Constitution 
was voted in on February 24, 1891. The winning coalition consisted of the export states (São Paulo, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Para, Amazonas) against the less cohesive opposition of the 
northeastern sugar states and Rio Grande do Sul (Costa, 1998). The new constitution left exports 
taxes under the control of state governments.  
  Following the framework of my model, it is clear that the federal government knew that 
conditions had changed as the economic power shifted from the center towards the periphery ( kF 
was lowered and kL increased), empowering local elites and making the secession threat credible. 
The federal government knew that the only way to create a unified Republic was to give up certain 
fiscal sources to the states. However, rather than seceding, the rich, exporting provinces voted in 
favor  of  a  central  government  with  some  taxation  powers  (e.g.,  on  imports)  and  capacity  to 
represent a united front when negotiating with other countries. In terms of the model, this means 
that θ (the marginal productivity of the federal government) was still relevant for the production of 
the states. The Federation’s proposal in the negotiations of the 1891 Constitution was the most 
centralist of all, and it was the position that ended up being adopted, thanks to the support of the 
                                                 
19  Each  São  Paulo  deputy  represented  145,141  inhabitants;  the  Pernambuco  deputies  represented  85,488 
inhabitants and the deputies from Amazonas represented 40,327 inhabitants. The representation in the Senate 
was similar. See Murilo (1980) and Viotti da Costa (1989)  
20 These included such powers as the levying of import taxes, taxes of entry and exit of ships, stamp , creation 
and maintenance of custom offices, and various banking regulations, among others.  17 
 
richest provinces. One of the arguments of the Ministry of Finance, Rui Barbosa (a former federalist 
republican during the Empire), was that the financial viability of the country was in risk if the 
Federation was not able to count on fiscal resources, even more so considering the high level of 
indebtedness inherited from the Monarchy. Furthermore, the landowner class was also aware that 
it needed the effective action of the Federal Government in order to satisfy the needs of the export 
sector.  Love  (1993)  points  out  that  those  issues  such  as  exchange  and  monetary  policy  and 
diplomatic representation were the responsibility of the central government, and were needed for 
the economic success of the coffee plantations. Only a united front could coordinate negotiations 
abroad, could facilitate loans, and could, eventually, coordinate coffee producers to control the price 
of their exports in international markets. On the other hand, the most radical states were the poor 
states of the Northeast or those states producing for the internal market (e.g., Rio Grande do Sul). 
For  them,  the  export  taxes  did  not  represent  a  considerable  flow  of  public  revenue  and  they 
demanded other sources of revenue. As they felt the federal government distant from their needs, 
they were not concerned about Federation’s financial weakness. 
  Under the new equilibrium, the Constitution allowed states to increase their share of public 
revenues to about one third (see Figure 4 in Appendix B). In the short run, export tax rates do not 
appear  to  have  been  modified,  implying  that,  with  the  new  constitutional  provisions,  revenues 
essentially shifted from the center to the periphery.21 In Table 3 (see Appendix B), I show that 
richer state governments increased their fiscal shares after 1891. For instance, São Paulo collected 
almost 40 percent of the total state public revenue in the country (three times as much as it 
collected before the Constitution in per capita terms) with almost half of the total exports and  less 
than one fifth of the population. Export taxes represented, on average, around 60 percent of the 
state government revenues between 1914 and 1919. 22 On the other hand, the northeast region 
exported  less  than  15  percent  of  Brazil’s  exports,  having  the  same  proportion  of  state  public 
revenue but with more than two thirds of the population. The relationship between the states and 
the  Federation  regarding  the  federal  receipts  and  expenditures  did  not  change,  as  states  kept 
                                                 
21 For instance, the São Paulo and Minas Gerais tax rate was of 11 percent (in the Empire coffee tax was 7 
percent for Federal Government and 4 percent for states) on coffee. By the beginning of the Century both states 
lower the tax burden as São Paulo fixed it at 9 percent and Minas Gerais at 8 percent (Love, 1980; Topik, 1987). 
Moreover, those similar tax rates show that states relying in the production of the same commodity did not 
compete among themselves. Another example of this is Amazonas and Pará, which taxed rubber exports with a 
rate of 20 percent and 22 percent of the market price, respectively (Lyra, 1914) 
22 Dependence on export taxes varied across states: while Goias and Rio Grande do Sul revenue’s share was 24 
and 29 percent respectively, states like Espirito Santo and Rio Grande do Norte depended on more than 85 
percent from export taxes. São Paulo’s share was 56 percent. 18 
 
contributing in a greater proportion to the Federal Treasury than was federally spent in the states. 
By 1914, the Federal Government still concentrated most of its expenditure (61 percent) in the 
capital area, a higher proportion than its contribution to the Brazil’s Treasury (46 percent).  In 
terms  of  the  expenditure  of  the  Ministry  of Transport  and  Public  Works,  the capital  obviously 
benefitted enormously, as 81 percent of its budget was spent in Rio.  
In  sum,  states  with  good  endowments  and  geographic  conditions  could  have  not  only 
generated exports but they could also build rich state treasuries. The value of the endowments was 
determined by the integration of international markets. The monopoly position of the coffee in 
international markets allowed governments (first the Imperial, later the states) to impose export 
taxes. The 1891 Constitution gave fiscal tools to the richest states to exploit their international 
monopoly position. Moreover, poor states were even more adversely affected because the central 
government did not implement a redistribution mechanism as I explore in Section IV. 
 
State Public Revenue before and after 1891 
The objective of this section is to perform empirical estimations to analyze whether the relation 
between exports and public revenues of state and federal governments at state level changed after 
the 1891 Constitution was written. Ideally, we would like to observe the direct effect of tax export 
revenue on total revenue. However, there is no availability for a long series of data for this variable. 
The approach followed here is an indirect one using exports as a proxy of export tax revenues. The 
underlying assumption is that states with higher capacity to export will be able to collect more 
export taxes and, furthermore, public revenue. Moreover, I also analyze if the relation between 
exports and federal revenue and expenditure at state level was affected after the 1891 Constitution. 
Data  
Compiling  fiscal  and  population  data  for  the  different  provinces  and  states  of  Brazil  required 
collecting them from a variety of official archival sources and published materials.  Appendix A 
describes in detail the sources and methodology of data collection of the variables used in the 
empirical  estimations.  The  period  covered  is  from  1870  to  1939.  Below  is  a  discussion  and 
description of the variables.  
International trade data includes exports and imports from the ports where the products 
were shipped from or arrived to. Although the data does not necessarily represent the origin or 19 
 
final destination of the merchandise,23 I consider that international trade in ports represents a good 
proxy for economic activity during this period. First, Brazil´s economy relied heavily on exports as 
explained in Section III. Second, production centers and/or final markets were close to the ports 
due to the expensiveness of ground transport across states. Third, the 1824 and 1891 Constitutions 
did not modify the boundaries of the states in such way that most of Brazil’s states were located on 
the seacoast or riverbanks. Therefore, states had relative autonomy to export through their ports. 
Fourth, even in the cases where the exports of a port were not produced in that state, the fact that 
they were being shipped from the port of other state shows that states with ports had an advantage 
in  their  geographic  positions.  In  these  cases,  port’s  states  had  the  possibility  to  impose  taxes, 
meaning loss of competitiveness in international markets and/or loss of state fiscal revenue for the 
producer state. Furthermore, the differential in tax rates for the same products across states might 
have determined the location of export’s shipments for some states. However, we do not observe 
high variation in tax rates across states.  
  International trade data are available for the eighteen states with ports (out of a total of 
twenty, plus the Federal District). Minas Gerais and Goias do not have reported data as they are 
landlocked  states  and  did  not  have  international  customs  offices.  Their  exports  were  usually 
shipped from the closest states with ports like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. While Minas Gerais 
was traditionally an important pole of development in Brazil, Goias’ production was poorer. During 
the colonial era and the gold boom, important economic settlements were located in Minas Gerais. 
In  the  nineteenth  Century  this  state  also  took  advantage  of  the  coffee’s  international  market 
conditions  to  trigger  its  economic  activity.  Although  the  national  reports  did  not  consider  the 
international trade activity of the state, a Minas Gerais government data compilation shows a long 
series of exports. Unfortunately, there is no detailed information regarding from which ports its 
exports were shipped, but it is well known that most were traded from Santos in São Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro city (see Wirth 1982). In order to include this important state in the sample and deal 
with the overestimated data for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, I adjust the export for the three states 
(see methodological Appendix).24  
                                                 
23 For instance, while imports of Rio de Janeiro were also for the consumption of Minas Gerais and Goias, Minas 
Gerais and Goias also produced items to be exported through the port of Rio de Janeiro. Imports arriving in 
Recife went to the consumption of Alagoas, Sergipe and Pernambuco. Exports shipped from Amazonas and Para 
also included Mato Grosso’s products; from Maranahão, Pernambuco and Bahia’s port were shipped products of 
neighboring states.  See Brazil, Commercio Exterior (1914). 
24 Regressions were also run excluding Minas Gerais’ exports and the results did not change.  20 
 
State Public Finance Data were processed from the Agriculture Ministry for the nineteenth 
Century, National Statistics Yearbooks, and Expenditure of the Empire and Republic (several years); 
Estatísticas do Século XX (IBGE), and State Government Reports (several years). I also use data on 
population (censuses and estimations from National Statistics Yearbooks) and prices (Contador and 
Haddad, 1975 and Catão, 1992) to deflate the variables at per capita terms. Federal Public Finance 
data was collected directly from the Imperial and Republican governments’ yearly fiscal balances.  
Empirical Strategy and Findings 
Table 4 (in Appendix B) shows the descriptive statistics. The last column shows the ratio between 
the average values of the variables after 1891, to its pre-1891 averages. The ratio indicates that 
state public revenue, and state public revenue per capita, grew faster than exports and exports per 
capita. The ratios suggest that the growth in state public finances after 1891 is not only driven by a 
growth in exports but by something else, that I presume is the state authority to collect export taxes 
established in the Republican Constitution.  
The general specification is: 
                                                       
Y is the dependent variable (state public revenue, federal public revenue and expenditure) in per 
capita terms in period t for state j. All the variables are in 1913 prices. EXP represents exports per 
capita; and REP is an indicator variable for the Republic and it is1, if the year is after 1891. I added 
it  as  an  interaction  term  with  exports  in  the  equation,  in  order  to  measure  how  the  exports 
determined the collection capacity of the states after the new Constitution was enabled. To control 
for time shocks common to all states (in some specifications we drop year dummies and include a 
post reform dummy) and unobservable characteristics of the states, I include time (  ) and state 
dummies (  ), respectively. I use population and imports (vector X) to control for the demand of 
more public revenue, and their sign is expected to be positive. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. The regressions include 19 states and the Federal District (Goias is excluded)25.  The period 
covered is between 1872 and 1939.  
  The results (see table 5 in Appendix B) show that the relation between exports and state 
public revenue was significant and positive once the Republican era began. The results are 
consistent for the different specifications. The results demonstrate that before 1891, exports and 
state public revenue per capita were not related, but after the Constitution, for every additional rei 
                                                 
25 For federal public revenue and expenditure, the Federal District is excluded given that most of the “national” 
public goods are accounted for, for the Federal District and it generates important distortions.    21 
 
per capita exported, the states collected around 15 cents more in public revenue at per capita 
terms.  
Table 6 (see Appendix B) shows some placebo estimations. In regressions 1 to 4, the last 
year of the sample is moved from 1939 to 1930, 1920, 1910 and 1900. The objective of this exercise 
is to check the sensibility of the results, changing the covered period as the weight for the sample 
after 1891 is larger than before 1891 (almost 50 years versus 19 years). Specification 5 shortened 
the period considerably as it includes only the period between 1887 and 1893 in order to avoid that 
other  variables  affecting  state  public  revenue  (including  omitted  variables)  remain  relatively 
constant in a short span of time. Although the coefficients are lower than the basic specification, it 
remains  highly  significant.  More  important,  the  conclusion  is  the  same:  the  1891  Constitution 
enabled  richer  states  to  collect  more  state  public  revenue.  The  second  group  of  estimations 
(regressions 6 to 8) moves the break point from 1891 to 1900, 1910 and 1920 in order to confirm 
that 1891 is the year that matters in determining the threshold for the tax collection capacity of the 
states.  The  results  show  that  the  coefficient  of  the  interaction  term  becomes  insignificant, 
reinforcing  the  idea  that  the  provisions  of  the  1891  Constitution  is  the  event  that  marked  the 
increasing of the financial capacity of the states, and not any other provisions that might have 
happened in the following years. Regressions 9 and 10 combined the two previous approaches, 
changing the breaking year and the period. The insignificant coefficient of the interaction term in 
the specifications confirms the previous findings. 
  In order to check if the change in the Constitution or in the general conditions of the public 
finances  was  for  all  tiers  of  governments  or  it  was  specific  to  state  governments,  I  re  do  the 
regressions for the federal government. Table 7 (in Appendix B) shows that the relation between 
exports and federal revenue (specifications 2 to 4) and expenditure (regressions 6 to 8) did not 
have changes after the implementation of the 1891 Constitution as the interaction term is negative, 
though not significant. Regressions 1 and 5, which do not include the interaction term, interestingly 
show a high correlation between the level of exports and the contributions and spending of the 
federal  government  at  the  state  level.  The  overall  results  indicate  that  during  all  the  analyzed 
period, exporting states pay more federal taxes and that the federal government spends more in 
rich states. We do not detect a structural break in 1891 in this relationship, as we did with state 
public finances. So, the Constitution only affected positively the state public finances but not the 
federal ones. The results also suggest that federal expenditure did follow a compensatory criterion 22 
 
for rich states, and not a redistributive in favor of  poor states between 1872 and 1939, as the 
exports coefficient in specification is positive in specifications 1 and 5.  
   In summary, export states had more available resources after the Republican Constitution 
(the sign is larger and the Brazilian export sector kept growing consistently) and, consequently, had 
more autonomy to collect it and spend it. Rich states also contributed more to the finances of the 
Federation but they did not receive back those resources, through federal expenditure. Although 
the relation in terms of federal revenue and expenditure did not suffer modifications, the richer 
states were compensated with the attribution of collecting export taxes, thereby deriving in more 
resources and also higher control over the revenue and expenditure realized in their territory.  
 
V.  From Fragmentation to Centralization: the Case of Mexico 
Mexico’s case shows an opposite trend than the one experienced in Brazil. During the first decades 
of independence, Mexico´s local governments were relatively more powerful and they have control 
over  a  fair  portion  of  the  public  revenue.  However,  a  slow  but  continuous  process  of  fiscal 
centralization  took  place  by  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  Century.  In  this  section  I  will  use  the 
analytical framework to understand the change of decentralization in Mexico.  
  Mexico became independent in 1821 after a decade of violent conflict. The first Constitution 
was  written  in  1824  with  generous  fiscal  provisions  to  state  governments.26  According  to 
Tenenbaum (1986, p.23), the country “had broken free from Mexico City during the insurgency and 
had  not  as  yet  been  put  under  Mexico’s  control.  Regional  leaders  were  reluctant  to  pledge 
allegiance and revenue to an empire headquartered in the capital and ruled by a former Spanish 
army officer. They preferred to remit some revenue in exchange for as much autonomy as distance, 
inefficiency, and geography would allow”. High fiscal autonomy for the regional elites was the cost 
that the federal government had to pay to keep the country united. To compensate such a loss, the 
Congress established the contingente, which it was a fixed payment that each state should pay in 
function of its population every year.  
  The incapacity of the federal government to generate enough revenues by its own, as well as 
the lack of control over the territory led the political elite to instrument a centralist reform in the 
mid  1830’s,  where  the  states  would  become  provinces  (governors  were  appointed  from  the 
                                                 
26 Sale taxes (alcabalas), duties on gold and silver, direct contributions, church contributions, income taxes on 
civil and ecclesiastical officials and taxes on pulque. On the other hand, Federal Government had the right to 
collect all port taxes and on national property; revenues from the monopolies of salt, tobacco, gunpowder, 
mints, post office and lottery 23 
 
Center). However, this reform failed as separatist regional revolts upraised (Texas, Sonora, Yucatan, 
Queretaro  and  Guanajuato).  The  price  of  the  centralist  experiment  was  the  loss  of  Texas  that 
declared  its  independence  and  Mexico  failed  to  surrender  the  rebellion.  The  failure  of  the 
centralism  is  attributed  to  three  reasons  (Tenenbaum,  1986):  First,  regionalism,  which  was  a 
movement against the central control during and after the independence. Second, the extension of 
Mexican territory, as well as the distance between the capital and the ports made centralization 
hard to implement and; finally the republic was unable to get legitimacy “to create new taxes, 
administer them efficiently, and stimulate investment”(p.55) and keep the Nation in order. The 
weakness of Federal Government is evidenced by the loss of more than half of its territory to United 
States.  Even  after  the  American  invasion  (1846-1848),  many  states  upraised  in  sake  of 
independence (Sonora, Yucatan, Chiapas, Guerrero, Puebla, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi). 
A new attempt to bring order to Mexico came in 1857, when a new Constitution was written 
and it tried to empower the Federal Government to prevent new dismemberments of the territory. 
The arrangements defined explicitly the taxes that Federal Government could collect. States were 
allowed to collect residually those taxes not defined as exclusive responsibility of the Federation. In 
practice, the central power levied indirect taxes and states were in charge of the direct taxes. The 
Constitution  also  established  anticlerical  clauses  that  generated  a  polarization  between 
conservatives and liberals, triggering a civil war. Its critical point was the rule of the Emperor, 
Maximiliano of Habsburg, with the backing of Mexican conservatives and Napoleon III (Bazant, 
1991). Maximilano lasted only 3 years in power. After that, a series of liberal presidents ruled 
Mexico, but stability kept absent.  
In sum, the new country was unable to construct national political institutions during the 
first 55 years of independence. The country had 75 presidents, lost about half of its territory, was 
unable to control army and local bosses, and was invaded by foreign forces. The political instability 
and social unrest impacted severely the economy27: Coatsworth (1978) has estimated that the GDP 
per capita in 1860 represented only 66 percent of the GDP per capita of 1800.  
In the context of the model, the  fiscal equilibrium observed in Mexico reflects a very weak 
federal government (low marginal federal government productivity  ) unable to provide safety, 
protection  against  external  threat,  negotiation  for  better  access  to  other  markets  due  to  the 
                                                 
27 Coatsworth (1978) argue that the economic difficulties of Mexico in the nineteenth century are due to two 
constraints in the Colony: 1) Geography: the country has no navigable rivers, making transport costs too 
expensive and; 2) Colonial institutional legacy: Judicial, political and economic institutions little propitious to 
free enterprise (p.94) as they were very extractive, discretional and greatly centralized.  24 
 
country’s continuous conflicts and incapacity to attract investments to the different regions. In sum, 
the marginal productivity of the federal government was very low, and thus, its bargaining power. 
Local elites did not perceive a benefit from giving up fiscal resources to the Federation as the latter 
did not have so much to offer back to the regions. The federal government’s vulnerability due to its 
incapacity to control the territory and keep it unified reflects the credibility of the secession threat 
of the states if they didn’t get more fiscal autonomy. The result was a high level of decentralization 
de facto.  
The  political  and  economic  situation  turned  into  a  new  direction  in  the  Porfirio  Díaz 
dictatorship (1876-1880 and 1884-1910). During Díaz’ tenure, Mexico reached peace and stability, 
promoting economic development and broaden national markets. The pursuit of those objectives 
could have interfered with the interests of regional elites, who had been responsible for many 
coups against the presidents and had enjoyed great autonomy in the past. Díaz instrumented a 
complex  political  strategy  combining  cooptation  and  repression  against  local  bosses.  His  first 
actions were to remove local caciques (governors) and put in place someone loyal to his cause. This 
strategy was also followed by its predecessors but soon the new caciques demanded autonomy. 
However,  Díaz  counted  with  several  advantages  that  allowed  them  to  control  efficiently  the 
regional leaders. The first one was the expansion of the railroad network in the country, which 
allowed  the  federal  forces  get  to  the  provinces  as  soon  as  a  governor  rebelled.  The  location 
(financed by foreign investment and granted for the central government) of the railroad lines was 
also used in favor of the central interests because of the positive economic effects that a cheaper 
and faster mean to transport merchandise could represent to the regions. Díaz also allowed the 
deposed governors and the new one received economic rents from the activities performed in their 
states as they act as intermediaries with foreign investors. This mechanism prevents rebellions 
from  the  local  oligarchy  since  local  instability  meant  dissuasion  of  foreign  investment  and 
consequently the closing of an important revenue source for the caciques. Finally, Díaz appointed 
military commanders with no local links where they were assigned to oversee the local officials and 
promoted the jefes politicos (district administrators) to control the police and armed forces. Now, 
they  were  loyal  not  to  the  governors  but  to  the  central  government  (see  Katz,  1991  for  this 
process).  
The  key  of  the  success  of  this  political  operation  was  the  impressive  economic  growth 
experienced in Mexico during the Porfiriato (as the Porfirio Díaz tenure is known), driven mainly by 
the exports boom. Between 1877 and 1910 GDP per capita doubled, see Coatsworth (1978)) as this 25 
 
enable him to distribute (and co-opt) economic rents among the local bosses, who were a constant 
source of political instability. Beyond the economic capacity to align the interests of the federal 
government  and  local  elites,  the  economic  bonanza  gave  financial  autonomy  to  the  Federal 
Government. To obtain more revenues, Díaz avoided keeping high taxes or executing forced loans, 
because those measures would drive away foreign investors (Katz, 1991). Thus, the composition of 
the federal revenue was based on precious metals, imports and timber taxes (consumption taxes). 
The federal public revenue increased consistently during his term.  
The engine of the economic growth during the Porfiriato was, as in Brazil, the export sector. 
Bulmer Thomas (1994) estimates that the exports per head in Mexico grew almost 500 between 
1870 and 1910.28 The Mexican export sector was also concentrated in a few commodities, mining 
products. Mining had always represented an important share of the economic output since colonial 
times but it had a severe depression in the post- independence era. During the Porfiriato, minerals 
and metals’ share in the Mexican exports ranged between 60 and 80 percent, where the most 
important  mineral  was  silver.  Mexican  silver  provided  around  one  third  of  the  international 
demand of this metal. The mining boom in this period was possible because of the surge in the 
international demand for minerals. Particularly, the industrial boom in United States increased the 
demand for Mexican metal mineral inputs. Around 75 percent of Mexican exports were delivered to 
its northern neighbor.  
Mexico could diversify, beyond the traditional silver and gold, their mining production too 
because the new worldwide industries demanded new minerals to their productive processes (e.g. 
zinc, lead and copper). Technological changes also increased the productivity in the sector (e.g. 
introduction of electricity to mining and cyanide process, see Sariego et al., 1988). 
The  mining  production  growth  was  mainly  due  to  the  role  of  foreign  investment.  The 
precarious  internal  capital  markets,  along  with  the  fact  that  mining  was  technically  more 
complicated and expensive to exploit (at least relative to crops like coffee), explain why the mining 
expansion could not be financed with national investments.29 However, these conditions would 
have not been sufficient to bring international capitals. Long roots of political instability did not 
guarantee the property right enforcement and it could have kept foreign capital away from Mexico. 
                                                 
28 Mexico’s exports per capita went from 2.3 dollars in 1870 to 10.7 in 1910. The exports/GDP ratio was 
around 14 percent in 1913. Brazil’s exports per head passed from 8.6 dollars to 14.2 in the same period. See 
Bulmer Thomas, 1994. 
29 Only 5 percent of the investments made in mining were domestic (see Haber, et al., 2003). 26 
 
In  addition,  foreign  investment  had  faced  other  obstacles  such  as  high  taxation  and 
underdevelopment of the national transport system.  
To overcome the potential risks for foreign investments, Porfirio Díaz allowed the economic 
elite to design the rules of their own economic activities. Haber, Maurer and Razo (2003) argue that 
in order to make credible the respect of those rules, the President encouraged state elites and 
politicians to participate in the economic activities and be members of the board of directors of 
many firms. Any attack of the President against the property rights of foreigners will be also an 
attack against the quasi-rents received by the local politicians. If Díaz was willing to violate the 
property rights of the firms, he would be breaking the implicit agreement with regional leaders and 
his presidency could have been in danger. Moreover, the tax system was modified to lower the 
burden in mining and a massive construction of railroads was implemented.  
However,  a  natural  question  rises  in  this  discussion:  Why  didn’t  the  local  elites  try  to 
appropriate the whole economic rents and threaten to become independent in order to negotiate 
directly  with  foreign  investors  or  why  didn’t  they  attract  the  investment  by  themselves  if  the 
mining wealth was in its soil? Haber et al. (2003) provide a feasible answer. They argue that local 
elites decided not to fight against the centralization to preserve their autonomy as they were also 
benefited from the mechanism designed by the Center. In the same line of argument, Carmagnani 
(1993, pp. 163-164) says that “the beginning of the American investment in the productive sector 
and railroads, led to states to diminish the intensity of their [fiscal] demands of sovereignty and, 
instead, they work collaboratively with the federation with the aim of being benefited from the 
economic reactivation”. The regional elites’ calculus should have considered the costs of a conflict, 
the probability of winning, the international perception which would make more difficult generate 
the needed foreign investment trust in a new, perhaps unstable country and the costs associated 
with stop being part of a greater country (greater internal market, common army, exclusion from a 
national railroad network). Moreover, the option of staying in a country with economic growth and 
political stability were high, increasing the bargaining power of the central government. In addition, 
the  change  of  relative  power  allowed  the  federal  government  to  be  the  entity  in  charge  of 
conciliating the diverse interests of the regions and to head the political economy.  
The consequence of the change of the bargaining power was the centralization of many laws 
(Medina 1997). Particularly two law changes had implications in the economic and fiscal relation 
between states and Federation: the elimination of the alcabalas (interstate taxes) and the mining 27 
 
code. Along with contribuciones,30 the interstate taxes were a permanent source of conflict between 
the two tiers of governments. Since 1848, the  alcabalas  were  legally  forbidden  but  they  were 
commonplace in the interstate transactions. It was until 1896 that the parties achieved a formal 
agreement where the states compromised stop collecting these taxes. This was a triumph of the 
Center because it unified the domestic market (and furthermore increase the federal government 
revenues);  and  signified  a  great  loss  for  the  revenue  of  the  state  government  as  alcabalas 
represented up to more than 40 percent of their revenue for some states.31 The negotiation too 
implied the elimination of the federal manufact ure tax, which had been created in 1880 and the 
states considered that invaded its autonomy (Carmagnani, 1993). Figure 5 (see Appendix B) shows 
the path of fiscal resources of states and Federation, where the latter consistently grew, while state 
governments could not expand its collection capacity.32  
 On  the  other  hand,  the  mining  reforms  intended  to  promote  foreign  investments, 
federalizing the legal framework and limiting state taxation on mining production. Since 1857 the 
states had the autonomy to legi slate on mining and, after a failed attempt in 1867; the mining 
legislation was finally federalized in 1883 (Sariego 1988). The main objective of this reform was to 
bring certainty to the investors. Now, instead of dealing with 32 different governments and  
legislation, and different risks of violation of the property rights, the foreign investors were under a 
single, federal law. The mechanism described above prevented federal government of expropriation 
and, furthermore, the federalization improved the tru st of investors (Haber et.al. 2003). This 
change also resulted in the weakening of the states’ position. The states’ loss of the capacity to 
legislate and deal directly with the capital owners meant that the federal government controlled the 
economic strategy of development. Further reforms limited the capacity of states to tax mining 
production.33 
The north and center regions, along with Yucatán were the most prosperous of the 
Porfiriato. Southeastern states based its economy on the cultivation of a couple of export corps. The 
most  emblematic  case  is  Yucatán,34  which main crop cultivated was sisal ( henequen,  used  for 
                                                 
30 The contribuciones were transfers made from state governments to the federal one during the first 
decades of Mexico as an independent nation. See Villa Patiño (1945) 
31 However, the elimination of alcabalas was not complete and survived until the second half of the twentieth 
century as Aboites (2001) points out.  
32 A very interesting contrast to the Brazilian case, it is that in 1898 the states were forbidden to borrow 
overseas, preventing them to have alternative sources of resources.   
33 The 1892 reform established that states could only set a maximum tax rate of 2 percent on the gross value 
production of the mining production. 
34 On the other hand, Chiapas and Tabasco foreign landowners cultivated mainly rubber and coffee. 28 
 
making rope and cordage). The demand for sisal increased considerably since the 1880’s when 
McCormick reaper started using it, representing around 15 percent of the exports in some years.  
Yucatán  represents  a  good  counterfactual  for  the  model.  This  state  is  peculiar  because 
unlike other export activities, the henequen haciendas and the local railway system were owned by 
Mexicans (Katz, 1991). Historically, Yucatan was seduced by the idea of becoming an independent 
nation.  Once  Mexico  became  independent,  local  creoles  landlords  cultivated  henequen 
independently and they developed little links with the capital and they saw naturally the idea of 
forming a new country. This was concretized in 1839, when the henequeros armed Mayan peasants 
to fight against the central army with the aim of declaring Yucatan an independent country, as it 
happens temporarily. However, the Mayans were recruited under the promise of privileges like 
abolition of taxes and the use of communal lands. The promise was not honored by the local elite, 
triggering  a  racial  conflict,  called  War  of  the  Castes,  where  the  whites  were  targeted  to  be 
exterminated. After some years of cruel conflict (half of the population disappeared), the rebellion 
was pacified but with help of the national army, eliminating the secession dream (Bazant, 1991). 
However, small elite controlled the production of the henequen in a relative autonomous way. The 
equilibrium of Yucatan is similar to the one we observe in Brazil in the late 20th Century, as it could 
produce  and  trade  independently  from  the  federal  government  (low  federal  government 
productivity).   
In contrast, the north had a more diversified economy (they exported minerals, chick peas, 
cattle and lumber) and part of their production was directed to the internal market (e.g. cotton in 
La Laguna). Some industries were raised in the north like steel, smelters of minerals and food 
processing. Although the Mexican capital was located in crops and some industries, the penetration 
of foreign capital was high, mainly in mining. Finally, in the central Mexico the traditional crops like 
corn and wheat did develop slowly, but there was an important industrial development in Veracruz, 
Puebla  and  Mexico  City. In  sum,  the  development  strategy  was  based  on foreign capital  which 
penetrated in central activities like mining, banking, industry and transportation (See Katz, 1991). 
Thus  Mexico,  like  Brazil,  had  regional  redistribution  of  economic  activities.  The  Center-
North of the country was favored by important mining sources in their soil and the international 
demand conditions to trigger production. However, unlike Brazil, the exploitation of the Mexican 
endowments  required  specialized  knowledge,  technology  and  machinery,  as  well  as  high 
investments  to  start  up  mining  projects.  Both  were  very  scarce  in  Mexico.  So,  the  economic 
initiative of developing the well endowed regions was instrumented in the center and not by the 29 
 
local elites. This necessarily altered the balance of power because the Federal Government decided 
who, how and where to invest in states were attentive to be granted with investments in their own 
territory,  where  the  local  economy  and  personal  finances  will  be  benefited.  The  increasing  in 
bargaining  power  by  the  federal  government  was  used  to  strengthen  its  economic  and  fiscal 
attributions of the Federation. Although, the economic activities were away from the Center of the 
country, the capital was the most beneficiary of the new order of things. Table 8 and Figure 6 (in 
Appendix B) show the regional reallocation of the mining and export activity in the ports of the 
country. The mining production is reallocated to the North, which passed from one fifth of the total 
mining production to more than half of the production between the beginning and the end of Díaz 
tenure in expense of the center states. The same trend is observed in the ports where the exports 
were shipped from. Tamaulipas, a US Border state with ports, increased its custom activities. In 
1877-78 less than 10 percent of the Mexican exports got out from there but by the end of the 
Porfiriato the share surpassed 40 percent. Veracruz, the traditional port linked to the economic 
activities of the Center, loss its relative export importance during the Porfiriato, going down from 
60 to 20 percent. Progreso’s port, located in Yucatan, reflects the cycle of henequen demand.  
However, we do not observe a similar trend in the regional property value according to the 
reallocation  of  economic  production  (see  table  9  in  Appendix  B).  Although  the  north  was  the 
leading region in mining production, it loses participation in the value of properties. Meanwhile the 
empowered  Federal  District  jumped  from  15  percent  to  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  national 
property values. This was mainly due to investments in urban properties promoted by the Federal 
Government. The last column of Table 9 (see Appendix B) shows that the regional share of the sales 
years  before  the  end  of  the  Porfiriato  was  also  very  concentrated  in  the  Center.  These  trends 
suggest that the northern reactivation enrich the center of the country and my argument is that it 
happens because the federal government’s role in economic promotion improved its bargaining 
power and most of the benefits of the economic growth were enjoyed in the capital.  
In spite of the decentralization of economic activity, fiscal centralization can be explained 
with  the  analytical  framework.  Mexico  also  participated  in  the  process  of  worldwide  trade 
globalization  experienced  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  Century.  The  country’s  exports, 
mainly mining, were produced in regions away from the traditional economic states (in the North, 
what in the context of the model is high kL) located in the Center of the country. However, the local 
elites were not independents in the production. The lack of financial capacity and technological 
knowledge prevented the local elite of developing the mining sector by their own. An additional 30 
 
factor that played a role in favor of the bargaining power was that many mining states were land or 
US border locked, in such way that they needed transportation and tax exemptions for interstate 
trade  in  order  to  reach  the  export  shipping  places.  All  these  circumstances  increased  the 
productivity of the Federal Government (high θ), as it was the only entity capable to bring foreign 
investment needed to mining and railroads. Moreover, its increased bargaining power allowed him 
to  eliminate  the  interstate  taxes  which  could  hinder  the  formation  of  national  markets.  These 
factors  made  the  Federation  more  powerful  and  able  to  centralize  fiscal  resources  without  a 
credible threat of state secession opposed as to the previous attempts of centralization, when there 
were not economic rents to co-opt the local elites. In conclusion, the period covering the Porfiriato, 
represented  two changes  in  the  variables of  the model  that changed  the relative  power  of  the 
Center and Periphery. From 1821 to 1876, Mexico had a very slow growth in economic activity, in 
part  due  to  the  incapacity  of  the  Center  to  stabilize  the  country  and  for  the  low  international 
demand for commodities produced in Mexico. This implied that Mexico had low K and low θ, in 
such way that, even the provinces had a low outside option/autonomous production, they did not 
require  help  from  Federation  to  produce  and  the  Center  was  so  weak  in  order  to  rule  in  the 
territory, leading to an equilibrium with a high tax share. Trade globalization changes the incentives 
of the players as the fundamentals of the model change. International demand made the value of the 
endowments to change increasing the value of the potential production. Moreover, the marginal 
productivity  of  the  federal  government  increases  given  the  characteristics  of  the  production 
function of mining as local elites were unable to exploit their resources by their own. So, the new 
equilibrium move to a one in which Federation share less tax revenue with sates.    
After the Revolution that overthrew Díaz, a new Constitution was written in 1917. Here it 
was established that all the subsoil (including mining and petroleum) resources belonged to the 
Nation and administered by the federal government. Two elements should be highlighted along 
with this regulation. The first one is that although the power in the country was divided among 
some regional revolutionary leaders, it was agreed that the main source of the national wealth was 
attribution of the Federation. The second one is that, in practice, the federal government did not 
produce minerals and petroleum as foreign firms were allowed to exploit those resources. The 
technical and financial incapacity of the government and domestic capital to run such businesses 
can explain both facts. Anyway in terms of federalism, the result of the new institutional changes 
benefited  the  tax  position  of  the  Federation  due to  the low  economic  bargaining  power  of  the 
regional leaders. Years later, in 1937, the government confiscated the foreign firms their petroleum 31 
 
infrastructure and it created PEMEX, an oil public monopoly company. After this, the petroleum has 
represented an important share of the GDP and it has financed the public expenditure (around 40 
percent of the total). Although the oil has been exploited in the states and not in the political Center 
of Mexico, this product is property of the Federation.  
 
VI.  Conclusion  
This paper provides a new explanation for differences in tax decentralization. I use a model to 
compare  the  fiscal  decentralization  trends  in  two  Latin  American  countries  with  very  similar 
characteristics. My model shows that, independently of the level of development, what it really 
matters when distributing fiscal resources is the regional distribution of the economic wealth and 
the relative capacity to exploit the endowments from local elites. Countries with richer provinces 
that are capable to exploit its endowments have bargaining power to negotiate tax attributions 
because its secession threat is credible. We illustrate these dynamics in Brazil where the economic 
empowerment of some of the Provinces due to a sudden positive valuation of its endowments led to 
higher autonomy. Mexico’s regions could not do it because of the financial and technical limitations 
to  exploit  mining  products.  Some  evidence  of  the  model  and  the  study  cases  showed  that  the 
incentives posed in a more decentralized country could lead to boost the overall public revenue as 
it was in Brazil. 
  Further work should expand the utilization of this model to explain the evolution of tax 
decentralization institutions in other Latin America countries or other regions. Another direction of 
further  work  is  to  explore  the  effects  of  these  institutional  arrangements  in  the  regional 
development of both countries. Although it is well known the relation between provision of public 
goods and development, it is intriguing why Mexico and Brazil has had a similar GDP per capita gap 
at least since the beginning of the twentieth Century given that the later has consistently collected 
more public revenue than the later. A hypothesis to be explored is that Brazil’s decentralization 
favored the provision of public goods in the richer states and the poor ones were left behind. On the 
other hand, even with a more centralist division of fiscal responsibilities, Mexico also suffers from 
important levels of regional inequality. This may indicate that the Federation has not been able to 
redistribute regionally the public resources. Finally, future work should emphasize the mechanisms 
of  institutional  persistence  of  federalism,  its  effects  on  economic  development  and  size  of 
government.  
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Appendix A. Sources and Methodology to Construction of the Dataset 
Variable   Source  Comments 
Federal  Public 
Finance 
Balancos  da  Receita  e 
Despeza  do  Imperio  e  da 
Republica  (1869-70  to 
1914),  Some datar for the 
eighties  were  taken  from 
Cavalcanti, Amaro, Resenha 
Finaceira do Ex-Imperio do 
Brasil  em  1889,  Rio  de 
Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 
1890. (from 1878-79 1886-
1887)  when  the  balances  
are  not  available.  The 
balances were downloaded 
from www.nemesis.org.br. 
Ministerio  da  Fazenda, 
Contas  do  Exercicio 
Financeiro  de  1926.  RJ 
Imprensa  Nacional  1927 
for  data  from  1915  to 
1927.  
From  1928  to  1938  see 
Quadros  Estatisticos  1,2 
and 3. 
 
The fiscal year until 1886-7 was from summer to summer, 
and from 1888 on the fiscal year changed from January to 
December. 
The figure for 1886-87 reported 3 semesters. It was adjusted, 
multiplying it by  2/3. 
Similarly, figure for 1933 includes 15 meses (12 from 1933 
and 3 from 1934) and 1934 is reported only for 9 months. It 
was adjusted in order to leave both figures at yearly base.. 
Between 1900 and 1927 part of the imports tax receipts was 
collected in gold. So, it was necessary to convert the amount 
of gold into paper reis.  The exchange rate between gold and 
reis was taken from between 1900 and 1924: Directoria Feral 
de  Estatistica  (Ministerio  da  Agricultura,  Industria  e 
Commercio),  Estatistica  das  Financas  do  Brazil,  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  1926.    For  the  1924-1927  period,  the  rate  was 
calculated as we know the total collected in paper and gold, 
as well as the total converted to paper from the Estadisticas 
historicas. From the total we subtract the amount denominate 
in paper and this result we divided by the amount in gold to 
get the exchange rate.  
Part  of  the  federal  revenue  and  expenditure  was  collected 
and spent in London (where the Ministry of Finance had an 
office and it was in charge of paying the external debt). It was 
not included. 
State  Public 
Finances 
For  data  before  1897,  we 
use Brazil (1914). For data 
from  1897  to  1939,  see 
AEB V (1939/40).  
 
Few  data  for  some  years  and  some  states,  the  data  is  the 
budgeted and not the “actual”. Some data reported was not 
for 1 year (either 6 or 18 months) and it was adjusted to be of 
12  months  (multiplying  by  2  or  2/3  respectively).  Finally, 
missing  data  for  some  years  was  filled  out  with  linear 
interpolation between the closest data points available. 
International 
Trade Data 
Data from 1888, Ministerio 
da Fazenda (1888) 
Data  from  1887,  1892  to 
1897  and  1903-1907  is 
from  Directoria  Geral  de 
Estatistica (1908). 
Data  from  1902  (imports) 
and  1901  and  1902 
(exports)  from  Servico  de 
Estatistica  Commericial 
,(1904) 
1908-1912  comes  from 
AEB I 
Data  from  1913-1927  and 
1935-40  comes  from 
Commerico  Exterior  do 
Brasil, several years.   
Information  from  1928-
1934  is  from  Serviço  de 
Estatística  Econômica  e 
Financeira (1938). 
Overall data of exports and 
imports  for  the  whole 
country from 1889-92 and 
1898-1901 was taken from 
1.. To fill out data gaps from 1889 to 1892 and 1898 to 1900 
for exports and 1898 to 1901 for imports we followed the 
following  strategy:  We  have  data  for  total  exports  and 
imports of Brazil for these years, so we calculated the values 
for  each  state  making  a  linear  interpolation  of  the  shares 
between the two known points of time and multiplying this 
share by the total imports and exports respectively. 
3. Information includes only 18 states, the ones which have 
customs offices (usually the states with river or sea ports). 
For this reason, no data available data for Goias and Minas 
Gerais (MG). The later one, however, has reported exports but 
not from which ports they were shipped from. However, we 
know that most of the exports were shipped from Santos (in 
São Paulo, SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ). So, in order to include 
this important state in the sample, we assume that the same 
share in the total exports for RJ and SP corresponds to the 
exports from MG in each port. So in this case, we subtract 
from the SP and RJ exports, the MG's share and recalculate 
the export values for these 3 states. For the MG export data 
for 1927-1931, we assume that the MG average export share 
between  1923  and  1927  will  prevail  for  the  rest  of  the 
studied period and we proceed with the same methodology 
as  explained  above.  In  order  to  show  that  results  of  the 
estimations  do  not  change,  we  also  use  the  exports  as 
reported  by  the  federal  publications  (excluding  MG). 38 
 
AEB  V. 
Data  from  Minas  Gerais  is 
Servico de Estatistica Geral 
(1929). Yearly information 
since  1839-1840  until 
1927. 
Unfortunately, data for imports for MG is not available. So, all 
the estimations including imports exclude MG.  
4.  Rio  de  Janeiro/DF.  Federal  District  is  located  in  Rio  de 
Janeiro city, which is in Rio de Janeiro state. Both the city and 
the states collected their own public revenue, but the federal 
revenue public revenue is consolidated. Moreover, the port of 
the state is in Federal District and it is not until the twenties 
when other ports were open in the state (eg. Angra dos Reis). 
So  we  can  not  distinguish  the  exports  made  by  the  city in 
itself or the state. However, we are confident that most of the 
state exports were shipped from the RJ port and most of the 
RJ port’s exports come from the commodities produced in the 
state.  Furthermore, we consider that the state was benefited 
from the exports and economic activity made in the port of 
Rio de Janeiro and vice versa and for this reason we use the 





The  sources  for  the 
population  are  from  the 
Population  Census  1890 
and 1900; and AEB V which 
contains data from 1900 to 
1939.  
 
Data from 1873 to 1899 was estimated through interpolation: 
We assumed a linear trend between censuses points for each 
state.  
Used to calculate the variables at per capita terms. 
Prices 
 
Index  prices  before  1913 
were  taken  from  Catao 
(1992)  and  from  then  on, 
see  Contador  and  Haddad 
(1975).   
 
Used to deflate the variables at 1913 prices.  
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Appendix B. Tables and Figures   
  
 
Sources: Mexico: AEEUM (several years), Peñafiel (several years) and EHM;











































































































































Figure 1. Federal Revenue/ (State + Federal  Revenue) in Brazil and Mexico 
(1870-2000)
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Figure 3. Rio de Janeiro  and Sao Paulo Exports Share (1855-1940)
RJ SP






1850 1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935








      
 
 












1886 1888 1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912












1877-1878 1882-1883 1887-1888 1892-1893 1897-1898 1902-1903 1907-1908 1926 1931 1936
Figure 6. Exports Shares by Selected States (1880-1940) 









PPP GNI per capita (world rank) (2003) 7510 (86) 8980 (80)
Agricultural share in GDP (2003) 6 4
Exports and Imports of Goods as %of GDP (2003) 30 58 (38)**
Urban population (% of total, World bank) (2003) 83 75
Population density (people per square kilometer) (2003) 21 (49)*** 54
Size of informal population as % of GDP
1 (early 1990’s)  37.8-29.0 35.1-49.0
Gini Index 59.3
 2 54.6 
3
Population below $2 a day % 22.4
 2 26.33






Territory Area (1000’s of square kms)
6 8514 1972
Democracy Index (2007) 
7 2 2.5
Ethnic fractionalization Index 
8 0.54 0.54
Language fractionalization Index (2001) 
8 0.04 0.15
Table 1. Comparative Statistics for Mexico and Brazil*(2000’s)
1Schneider, et.al (2000), First figure is MIMIC approach average between 1990 and 1993 and the second one is
the physical input method for 1989-1990. 
2 Figure for 2001. Data from poverty and inequality are from income surveys for Brazil. 
3 Figure for 2000. Data from poverty and inequality are from expenditure surveys for Mexico.
4 Average of 6 institutional indexes (ranging from -2.5 and 2.5)Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule
of Law and Control of Corruption. In parenthesis variance is shown. Data from Kaufman, et.al (2006).
5 La Porta, et.al. (1999).
6. Wikipedia
7. Freedom House Democracy Index. The index can take values from 1 (completely free) to 7(no free).
** Parentheses figure show the openness considering only non-maquila foreign trade.  
8. Alesina, et.al (2003). Index is between 0 (lowest fractionalization) and 1. Broadly, fractionalization
 means there is more groups evenly distributed in the population. Mexico’s figure is for 1990 and Brazil 1995. 
*Information mainly taken from World Development Report, 2005 at least otherwise indicated
***In parentheses, the figure shows the population density of Brazil without taking into account the inhabited and 





Total Revenue (% of GDP) (1) 40.50% 24.40%
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (2) 26.66%
 1  10.60%
Share of Local Governments in (1) 31.50% 5.80%
Share of Local Governments in (2) 37.70% 5.60%
Post transfers participation of Local Governments in Total Revenue  40.30% 22.3%
2
% of FG collection transferred to LG 12.90% 21.4%
3
% of LG own income of in their total available income 78.10% 28.8%
4
3. See note 2.
4. See note 2.
Table 2.  Tax indicators for Brazil and Mexico (2004)
Own ellaboration with data from:
Brazil: Data includes tax revenue, contributions and other receipts (Patrimonial, Services, Industrial and Other). 
The two former were taken from Receita Federal (2005) and the latest from Tesouro Nacional (2004), Contas 
Nacionais. Financial sources are excluded.  Mexico: Data from Federal Government from Informe de Gobierno (2006) and from Local Governments, Finanzas 
Publicas Estatales y Municipales de Mexico 2001-2004 INEGI (2006). Includes Income from Public Enterprises 
and excludes financial sources.
1. For Federal Government, I only consider Social Security contributions, PIS, PASEP and FGTS as contributions. The 
2. The considered transfers are only Participaciones which can be used by the local governments freely. 
taxes according to the classification of the IMF.







Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1870-1889 72.8% 16.6% 2.4% 8.1% 67.0% 1.8%
Average 1890-1909 81.5% 8.6% 2.2% 7.7% 76.9% 1.8%
Average 1910-1929 84.2% 7.3% 2.1% 6.4% 76.5% 4.3%
Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1870-1889 63.0% 24.7% 6.1% 6.1% 54.6% 6.8%
Average 1890-1909 66.0% 16.5% 9.6% 7.8% 50.6% 14.0%
Average 1910-1929 77.8% 10.8% 3.3% 8.1% 47.8% 26.8%
Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1855-1870 44.3% 38.4% 7.0% 10.3% 22.0% 8.3%
Average 1870-1889 46.8% 31.5% 11.5% 10.1% 19.3% 13.9%
Average 1890-1909 59.5% 16.3% 16.2% 8.1% 20.8% 26.1%
Average 1910-1929 64.4% 17.3% 3.6% 14.7% 17.1% 30.2%
Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1870-1889 15.3% 23.7% 31.6% 28.7% 7.9% 33.4%
Average 1890-1909 31.5% 33.5% 46.1% 34.4% 17.3% 48.9%
Average 1910-1929 32.8% 48.6% 38.9% 51.6% 17.4% 39.9%
Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1852-1869 55.4% 34.9% 4.1% 5.6% 54.3% 1.1%
Average 1870-1889 59.8% 29.0% 5.1% 6.1% 52.7% 6.8%
Average 1890-1909 62.8% 18.1% 10.9% 8.2% 43.3% 18.5%
Average 1910-1929 77.6% 12.1% 2.2% 8.1% 42.0% 35.2%
Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1852-1869 50.3% 37.7% 5.0% 7.0% 44.9% 5.4%
Average 1870-1889 65.5% 22.9% 8.0% 3.6% 46.5% 18.5%
Average 1890-1909 58.5% 13.5% 23.8% 4.3% 18.4% 37.3%
Average 1910-1929 71.9% 14.3% 4.9% 8.9% 16.6% 51.3%
Southeast Northeast North South RJ and Federal District São Paulo
Average 1872-1889 44.0% 43.9% 3.3% 8.8% 10.2% 9.1%
Average 1890-1909 46.4% 39.3% 3.9% 10.4% 9.5% 12.6%
Average 1910-1929 47.2% 36.8% 4.4% 11.6% 9.0% 15.0%
Data on public finance do not include Acrea and London.
Southeast include Rio de Janeiro, Federal District, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Espiritu Santo, Goias and Mato Grosso; 
Northeast Alagoas, Bahia, Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande Do Norte, Sergipe, Paraiba, Maranhão and Pernambuco; North, Amazonas 
and Para and; South Parana, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul.




State Public Revenue/ (State Public Revenue + Federal Public Revenue)
















State Public Revenue  (1000's of reis) 1400 11,385         26,570         103         281,209       6.67
State Public Revenue per capita (1000's of reis) 1360 8.7                 9.5                 0.5           76.7               2.03
Exports  (1000's of reis) 1252 50,151         93,244         2.08        671,074       3.43
Exports per capita (1000's of reis) 1220 39.4              58.8              0.004     711.0            1.68
Imports (1000's of reis) 1244 40,482         104,609      1              761,768       2.97
Imports per capita  (1000's of reis) 1212 28.9              56.5              0.01        418.2            1.36
Population (thousands) 1360 1,119.7        1,331.0        57.6        8,086.0        2.24
1 conto is equivalent to one million of reis.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exports per capita  0.11*** 0.055*** 0.053 0.014*** -0.049 -0.046 -0.045 -0.043 -0.042
(0.004) (0.005) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Exports pc*Post 1891 0.132*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Post 1891 -0.00190*
(0.00)




Constant 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.0062***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.00118)
Observations 1288 1288 1288 1288 1288 1288 1220 1220 1220
States 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19
R-squared 0.375 0.096 0.267 0.547 0.465 0.515 0.512 0.542 0.517
Time Dummies No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No
State Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Errors by State No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5.   State Public Revenue per capita  (Brazil states 1872-1939).
State Public Revenue per capita
 Dependent variable is the state public revenue per capita at 1913 reis. All the specifications are OLS panel data. The hypothesis tested is 
that the 1891 Constitution brought a change in the relation between the public revenue collected by states and exports per capita. Exports 
are incorporated in two ways: 1) the exports for the whole period; and 2) an interaction term that multiplies exports by a post 1891 
dummy. A positive and significant sign in the second coefficient confirms our hypothesis. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in 


























Exports per capita  -0.037 -0.033 -0.011 0.023 0.004 0.001 0.051 0.053 0.041 0.099***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
Exports pc*Post 1891 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Exports pc*Post 1900 0.089 0.000
-0.061 -0.029
Exports pc*Post 1910 0.021 -0.052
-0.065 -0.022
Exports pc*Post 1920 0.055
(0.07)
Imports per capita -0.015 -0.037 -0.061 -0.027 -0.012 -0.020 -0.011 -0.016 -0.05 0.022
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Population 0.0029* 0.001 0.003* 0.006* 0.029*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.006 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.004 0.008* 0.007** 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.018*** 0.005**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 1034 860 683 507 131 1220 1220 1220 344 695
Number of stcode 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared 0.544 0.549 0.609 0.554 0.478 0.410 0.311 0.318 0.193 0.449
Table 6.   State Public Revenue per capita  (Brazil states 1872-1939). Placebo estimations
State Public Revenue per capita State Public Revenue per capita
Dependent variable is the state public revenue per capita at 1913 reis. All the specifications are OLS panel data. The hypothesis tested is 
that the 1891 Constitution brought a change in the relation between the public revenue collected by states and exports per capita. Exports 
are incorporated in two ways: 1) the exports for the whole period; and 2)  an interaction term that multiplies exports by a post-1891 
dummy. Specifications from 1 to 4 run the estimations in different periods to check the sensibility of the results. In specifications 5 to 10 
the interaction term is multiplied by a different time-threshold dummy (1900, 1910 and 1920).  Robust standard errors clustered at state 
level in parentheses. All estimations include state and time dummies. Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5% 














































0.02209*** -0.00823 0.00911 0.00911
(0.019) (0.079) (0.042) (0.045) (0.003) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015)
Exports pc*Post 1891 0.02028 -0.08224* -0.0812 0.03115 -0.00135 -0.0013
(0.068) (0.045) (0.048) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020)
Imports per capita 0.24914** 0.2277** 0.07843* 0.07784**
(0.088) (0.080) (0.038) (0.036)
Population 0.00223 0.00006
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.00329* 0.00331* 0 -0.00309 0.00370*** 0.00370*** 0.00300*** 0.00325
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 1143 1143 1077 1077 1013 1013 955 955
Number of stcode 19 19 18 18 19 19 18 18
R-squared 0.628 0.629 0.751 0.761 0.23 0.239 0.299 0.299
Table 7.  Federal Public Revenue and Expenditure per capita  (Brazil states 1872-1939)
Dependent variable is the federal public revenue and expenditure per capita at 1913 reis. All the specifications are OLS panel data. The 
hypothesis tested is that the 1891 Constitution brought a change in the relation between the federal public finance and exports per capita. 
Exports are incorporated in two ways: 1) the exports for the whole period; and 2) and as an interaction term multiplied by a dummy which 
takes 1 if the year is after 1891. A positive and significant sign in the second measure confirms our hypothesis. Clustered Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. State and year dummies included in all the specifications. Coefficients marked with: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** 














North 20.4% 56.4% 54.6%
Center 78.9% 43.5% 45.2%
South 0.6% 0.0% 0.3%
Source: Penafiel (1899, 1907) and Busto (1880).
Norte: Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora, Baja California, Tamaulipas.
Central: Aguascalientes, Colima, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, 
Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Zacatecas, Tepic.
South:  Campeche, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Yucatan.
Table 8 .Regional Distribution of Mining Production in Mexico 1878-1907
Total Sales 
1877-78 1891 1891 1907 Average  1905-1909
North 15.6% 11.3% 13.1% 11.3% 20.1%
Center 63.9% 60.7% 54.1% 51.6% 44.5%
South 6.4% 5.9% 10.7% 9.9% 10.4%
Federal District 14.1% 22.1% 22.1% 27.2% 25.0%
Source: Penafiel (1893, 1899, 1907) and Busto(1880); The Mexican Yearbook.
Norte: Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora, Baja California, Tamaulipas.
Central: Aguascalientes, Colima, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, 
Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Zacatecas, Tepic.
South:  Campeche, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Yucatan.
Regional Share of Property Value
Table 9. Regional Share of Property Value in Mexico